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Introduction
Agency interactions between shipper and freight forwarder, and between intermediaries
and shippers, are commonplace in logistics and freight transportation. Surprisingly the
efforts to model the choices of shippers in respect of mode and freight forwarder have
treated each agent as a mutually exclusive decision element in the supply chain. Unlike
passenger transportation where the independence of agents is more acceptable, the non-
independence is much more critical in the freight transportation sector. Only where agent
independence is assured in a true competitive market for goods and services can we treat
each observation in the same manner that they are treated in traditional discrete choice
models.
Logistics decision making under a contract regime is illustrative of agency
interdependency. Examples include negotiation, bargaining and sometimes arbitration
between shipper and freight forwarder, and between freight forwarder and carrier. Such
interactive agency decision making leading to choices which may not necessarily be each
agents preferred outcome, are well encapsulated by a non-zero sum cooperative game of
the Nash bargaining equilibrium structure. Such a regime is typically non-compliant with
a truly competitive market where non-interactive specifications of discrete choice models
can safely be assumed for modelling the choice process of each agent in the logistics
chain. That is, the situation where a shipper chooses a freight forwarder from a universal
finite choice set of freight forwarders in a strictly competitive regime under random
utility maximisation.
Rather, what reality typically displays is a situation where shippers, through historical
search and experience, have already limited their choice set to a subset of freight
forwarders (often referred to as choice through bounded rationality). The market depicts
a host of different contractual deals in which agency interdependencies serve to impose a
recursive structure on choices made between shippers and freight forwarders, between
freight forwarders and carriers, and even between shippers and carriers (bypassing the
transaction cost advantage offered by an intermediary such as a freight forwarder or
other third party logistics business).
This paper concentrates on the contract environment where negotiation, deals, repeat
business are the trend in agent choices in logistic chains, in contrast to open-market
competitive decision making. It proposes a framework within which multiple agents
make discrete choices in respect of a common objective - namely the delivery of a
consignment from its origin to its final destination. The theoretical framework uses ideas
from game theory, discrete choice models with relatively free covariance structures (ie
across-agent correlation), and forward-backward linking stated choice experiments
capable of evaluating sequential-move and ‘one-shot’ simultaneous move negotiation
regimes. We propose an empirical template in which a controlled experiment can be
implemented on a sample of freight forwarders and shippers moving specific
consignments to an international or domestic destination.
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Theoretical Framework For Choice Making In A
Logistics Chain
Any situation involving interaction between two or more individuals has elements of
cooperation and non-cooperation. The choice outcome matters to each of them and
depends on the actions of both or all of the players. At the outset of a negotiation, each
individual perceives the extent to which other participants are cooperative, defined as a
commitment to choose a joint plan of action. This does not imply that either participant
sacrifices their interests for the sake of the other; only that each communicates and
coordinates with a view to furthering their own unchanged interests by so doing. The
central position here is that the neo-classical economic view that ‘private decision-
making leads to everyone’s good’ (or agent-independent utility maximisation) depends
critically on assuming a regime of perfect competition with numerous participants. In the
context of shippers and freight forwarders this is an unrealistic assumption.
Game theory provides compelling support for the application of a two- (or n-tuple)
person cooperative game in which the shipper and the freight forwarder can cooperate
(there being nothing to prevent them from arriving at an outcome as to what each will
do). Cooperation assumes compliance with two tests: (1) for both the freight forwarder
and the shipper it cannot be bettered by some agreement, and (2) for either the freight
forwarder or the shipper it cannot be bettered by one participant going their own way.
Importantly, however, whether the freight forwarder and shipper will end up acting as a
unified agent (i.e. cooperation), depends on decisions made entirely non-cooperatively by
each decision unit.
There may be lots of outcomes that pass the two tests (known as von Neumann-
Morgenstern solution set of the cooperative game). Fortunately Nash solved this
problem of indeterminacy through bargains by recognising that the outcome of a failure
to agree (all offers and counter-offers rejected) is predetermined as the status quo. The
game-theoretic context is used to study the evolution through negotiation and bargaining
of alternative logistics regimes offered by freight forwarders and accepted by shippers
and offers an appealing framework within which to design choice experiments. The
dynamics of game play is noticeably absent in the literature on stated choice experiments
in general and in the revelation of the choice set and the preferred/chosen alternative
logistics practices of shippers.
To illustrate how bargaining in a game context works, assume three alternatives in the
trade, two as outsourced attribute bundles provided by a freight forwarder defined by fee
per shipment, damage per shipment, on-time delivery per shipment, and transaction time
per shipment; and one as internal sourcing (which for the freight forwarder is a non-
accepted offer). Suppose the shippers first strategy (s1) is to opt for outsourced bundle 2;
the second strategy (s2) is to opt for outsourced bundle 3; and the third option (s3) is to
provide the service in house. The freight forwarders strategies (ff1, ff2 and ff3) consist in
offering the options in the order ff2, ff1 and ff3; where ff3 is the non-offer. If they do not
agree to one of these exchanges, the shipper will perform the task inhouse. The payoffs
might be as given in Table 1. Each cell identifies the payoffs to each agent. For example,
in (3,-1), 3 represents the payoff to the shipper and -1 is the payoff to the freight
forwarder. Thus if the shipper chooses the outsourced offer bundle s2, but the freight
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forwarder chooses not to accept this offer (ie to select ff1), then the shipper receives a
payoff of 1.5 and the freight forwarder a payoff of 0.5.
Table 1. A bi-matrix of payoffs in an interactive logistics preference game
freight
forwarder
freight
forwarder
freight
forwarder
ff1 ff2 ff3 (non-offer)
shipper
(outsource)
s1 (3,-1) (1.5, 0.5) (1.5, 0.5)
shipper
(outsource)
s2 (1.5, 0.5) (2.5, 1) (1.5, 0.5)
shipper (in-
house)
s3 (1.5, 0.5) (1.5, 0.5) (1,2)
The off-diagonal payoffs show the expected utilities if their demands are not acceded to.
It makes no difference which demand is refused. If they fail to agree the outcome is
always the same - no outsourcing. The attainable region R in payoff space and the status
quo point (s3, ff3) are shown in Figure 1. The negotiations between the shipper and the
freight forwarder are assumed to be quite frank - all cards on the table. The theory of
bargaining games does not say what we might hear if we witnessed the negotiations -
arguments based on inter-temporal comparisons of utility, or on principles of fairness,
appeals to tradition etc. but it is clear that we would not observe the dissembling
maneuvres typical of real bargaining in which the shipper and freight forwarder might
begin by exaggerating their true minimum terms, compromising only if necessary.
Interacting Agents and Discrete Choices in Logistics Outsourcing: A Conceptual Framework
Hensher & Chow
4
Figure 1. Outsourcing and In House Preferences
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The arbitration associated with the bargaining game is defined by Nash as follows: For
any point (Ua, Ub) in R, consider the quantity (Ua-Sa)(Ub-ffb), the product of the
shipper and the freight forwarders utility increment from the status quo. Now find (Ua,
Ub) in R that maximises this product subject to the constraints that Ua ³ Sa, Ub ³ ffb.
This bargaining solution is in outcome space representing the basket of attributes which
are sources of expected utility. The outcome of cooperative games, the pairs of baskets
or attribute mixes, define the feasible set of distributions in outcome space. The search
for the feasible sets can be implemented through choice experiments. The choice
probabilities from the choice experiment provide the information to construct the
expected utility matrix, an input into interactive agency utility maximisation.
The Nash solution for Table 2 (Figure 2) is (s2, ff2) with a probability of 0.9167
(outsource offer 2) and (s1, ff1) with a probability of 0.0863 (outsource offer 1). The
payoffs are (2.375, 0,083). This is the best we can do - cooperation is achieved up to  a
probability of 0. 9167. This solution satisfies Pareto-optimality in that a distribution
should not be chosen if there is another distribution which is feasible and which one
player prefers and the other does not prefer. If there was an outcome with expected
utilties Ua, Ub, one bigger and one as great as the payoffs of the Nash solution, then the
latter would not maximise the product of utility gains, contrary to their definition
(Gibbons 1992). It also meets the shipper’s and freight forwarder’s security levels and
hence is what von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) called the negotiation (or solution)
set.
The mapping between payoff and expected utility is not exact. The off-diagonal expected
utilities are likely to be different in each cell and thus the validity of the Nash solution of
equal payoff does not translate into identical expected utilities in the off-diagonal cells.
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Indeed, the theory sets out to describe not behaviour but non-cooperative modes of
choice.  This is why the off-diagonals can be equivalent.  In the study of behavioural
responses in preference space, this need not be so.  Another way of saying this is that
although the outcome of non-agreement will always be the same across all non-
agreement pairs, the utility that an agent would have derived from securing a specific
outcome if agreement had been reached is unlikely to be the same. Our interest is in
revealing the expected utility of agency outcomes and in translating this into a set of
cooperative and  non-cooperative probabilities of paired outcomes. The sum of the joint
probabilities in the three diagonal cells define the cooperative probability set. The choice
probabilities from a discrete choice model might be as given in Table 2. These are
illustrative and bear no relationship to Table 1. Cooperation is achieved up to a
probability of 0.402, comprising the outsourced offer 1 (0.0667), outsourced offer 2
(0.2324) and in-house support (0.1027). These cooperative probabilities can be identified
at each stage (or pass between the two agents) in the sequential-move interactive agency
experiment.
Table 2. A Bi-Matrix of Choice Outcomes in an Interactive Logistics
Outsourcing Preference Game
freight
forwarder
freight
forwarder
freight
forwarder
ff1 ff2 ff3
shipper s1 (.208,.250) (.208,.583) (.208,.168)
shipper s2 (.375,.250) (.375,.583) (.375,.168)
shipper s3 (.417,.250) (.417,.583 (.417,.168)
An Empirical Paradigm - Interactive Stated Choice
Experiments
The theoretical ideas developed above can be translated into a stated choice experiment
in which each agent makes a choice in the light of the attribute levels associated with
each alternative. These choices may be in the context of knowledge of the other agent’s
preferred offer or without such knowledge. Through a simultaneous or sequential move
strategy, the stated choice experiment is offered to both parties who might agree in one
pass or who require a series of passes before a final ‘equilibrium’ outcome is arrived at.
The possibility of non-agreement is also very real. We refer to such an experiment as an
Interactive Agency Choice experiment (ICE). An ICE experiment can involve multiple
agencies such as a shipper and competing freight forwarders. We develop the approach
in the context of one shipper and two freight forwarders, recognising that the method
can be generalised to any pair or n-tuple of agents.
A number of experiments can be administered to a sample of shippers and their
associated freight forwarders for a specific consignment. The shipper is first selected and
interviewed in respect of a particular consignment being shipped between a given origin
and a given destination. It is assumed that a freight forwarder will be contracted to
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undertake the transhipment unless there is no agreement, in which case the shipper
undertakes the logistics task in-house. After the shipper has completed the first round of
the choice experiment involving the evaluation of say three alternatives defined in terms
of  transaction time, total cost and service reliability scenarios, which is repeated a total
of 3 times, each freight forwarder is asked to make an offer in the context of the same
choice experiment but under two information scenarios - with and without knowledge of
the shippers preferred choice on each of three replications. In an n-tuple experiment with
two freight forwarders, each freight forwarder evaluates the situation under two
‘competitive’ contexts - the presence and absence of a ‘competitor’.
A set of first round responses are then fed back to the shipper who assesses the
‘preferred offers’ of each freight forwarder  and then repeats in a second round the same
experiments, revising or staying with their preferred first round offer. The outcome is
then fed back to each freight forwarder who then re-evaluates their position in the face of
the shipper’s second-round response (this time there is no scenario of ignorance of the
shipper’s preferred response). The freight forwarder is now however supplied with the
shipper’s first and second round ‘preferred’ offers. Each freight forwarder is also
supplied with the first round offer of the other freight forwarder (assumed to be known
via the shipper - although we could consider later information feedback via the shipper
which is partial in that it might only be an indication that the other freight forwarder is
currently preferred).  Each freight forwarder then makes a further offer which may
maintain their first round offer in the presence and in the absence of a competitor. The
outcome is then fed back to the shipper who in a third and final round evaluates the
offers and selects a freight forwarder or decides to undertake the logistic task in-house.
This eliminates the competing freight forwarder or both freight forwarders.
The selected freight forwarder is then given one final opportunity to accept or reject the
offer from the shipper. If the offer is accepted, that is the end of the process; if he rejects
the offer the shipper gives the other freight forwarder the opportunity to accept the offer.
If the other freight forwarder accepts the offer that is the end of the negotiation process;
if he rejects the offer the shipper is assumed to terminate the negotiations and consider
other options. The experiment does not extend into the negotiation space of the new
option set. Figure 2 summarises a possible interactive agency path.
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Figure 2. An Illustrative Interactive Agency Process
First  Round
Freight ForwarderSingle
Freight Fowarder 1
Freight Fowarder 2
Shipper
Freight Forwarder
Freight Fowarder 1
Freight Fowarder 2
Second Round
Third Round
Shipper
Preferred
Freight
Forwarder
Fourth Round
Preferred
Freight Forwarder
revised or existing
offer
Shipper preferred
offer
Preferred offer
Preferred offer
Preferred offer
Preferred offer
Preferred offer
Preferred offer
revised or existing
offer
Shipper accepts offer
Shipper rejects offer
STOP
Fifth Round Shipper makes offer
to other freight forwarder
Other freight
forwarder accepts
offer
STOP
Other freight
forwarder rejects
offer
Shipper Terminates
negotiations and considers new strategy  STOP
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A number of deign strategies can be considered to take into account the nature of the set
of agents. For illustration, if we assume three attributes (door to door travel time,
consignment cost and reliability) each at three levels, the stated choice experiments
involve three designs (SCI, SCII, SCIII):
SCI: Shipper choice set of 3 alternatives each with 3 attributes at 3 levels:
Alt 1 Alt1 Alt1 Alt2 Alt2 Alt2 Alt3 Alt3 Alt3
time cost reliab time cost reliab time cost reliab
SCII: Independent Freight forwarder choice set same as for shipper plus the shipper
first round preferred offer
SCIII: Interactive Freight Forwarder choice set of 9 alternatives each with 3 attributes
at 3 levels but mixing the two freight fowarder attribute offers in a subset of
alternatives:
Alt 1
(F11|F21)
Alt1
(F11|F21)
Alt1
(F11|F21)
Alt2
(F11|F22)
Alt2
(F11|F22)
Alt2
(F11|F22)
Alt3
(F11|F23)
Alt3
(F11|F23)
Alt3
(F11|F23)
time cost reliab time cost reliab time cost reliab
Alt 1
(F12|F21)
Alt1
(F12|F21)
Alt1
(F12|F21)
Alt2
(F12|F22)
Alt2
(F12|F22)
Alt2
(F12|F22)
Alt3
(F12|F23)
Alt3
(F12|F23)
Alt3
(F12|F23)
time cost reliab time cost reliab time cost reliab
Alt 1
(F13|F21)
Alt1
(F13|F21)
Alt1
(F13|F21)
Alt2
(F13|F22)
Alt2
(F13|F22)
Alt2
(F13 |F22)
Alt3
(F13|F23)
Alt3
(F13|F23)
Alt3
(F13|F23)
time cost reliab time cost reliab time cost reliab
Note: Fij|kl = ith (or kth) freight forwarder and jth (or lth) alternative
In experiment SCIII there are 9 alternatives being evaluated for each freight forwarder
which indicate what the ‘offer’ is from the competing freight forwarder.
These choice experiments will produce a set of expected utilities leading to the
determination of cooperative choice probabilities associated with each mixture of
outcomes evaluated by a freight forwarder and a shipper. The analysis of each pass in the
interactive choice experiment is best represented as a recursive discrete choice paradigm
in which the prior agent’s choice conditions the subsequent agent’s choice. The recursive
structure embodies the shipper and the freight forwarder ‘flip-flopping’ as the prior and
subsequent agent in each round of the ICE. Sequential estimation of each agent’s choice
process at each pass in the sequential negotiation process will enable us to track the
choices made and their revisions up to the point of cooperation or experiment
termination if there is no agreement after a predetermined number of rounds.
A series of choice models can be estimated to evaluate potential influences on the
shipper’s and the freight forwarder’s preference for the each of three offers. In addition
to the design attributes, the role of contextual variables describing the shipper and the
freight forwarder, as well as structural influences on the execution of the interactive
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choice experiment (ICE) can be included. The estimation procedure is recursive
multinomial logit, although nested logit, heteroskedastic extreme value and multinomial
probit models could also be estimated (Hensher et al (Forthcoming)). The following
steps highlight the sequential recursive estimation procedure for an experiment involving
only a shipper and 1 freight forwarder:
· Step 1: First sequential move offer of shipper - 3 replications per shipper.  As the first
experiment there is no involvement of the freight forwarder.
· Step 2: First sequential move offer of freight forwarder - the same 3 replications as per the
shipper. The knowledge of the shipper’s offer is revealed to half of the freight forwarders only.
We might include a variable representing the actual offer from the shipper for the subset who
are informed of the shipper’s choice. If the shipper and freight forwarder agree on the offer in
pass 1 for a specific replication, then that concludes the ICE for the agency pair. This state of
negotiation is identified by a ‘pass agreement’ dummy variable (=1 if agree and 0 otherwise).
· Step 3: Evaluate the influences on the pass agreement (1,0) outcome for the first sequential
move offers. These influences include design attributes, individual characteristics and each
agent’s perception of the opportunities and constraints associated with alternative offers.
· Step 4: Calculate the expected utility matrix for the shipper and the freight forwarder and
identify the cooperation probability for each alternative.  The non-cooperation probabilities for
each off-diagonal pair of alternatives are also identified.
· Step 5: Second sequential move of the shipper given the freight forwarder’s offer in pass 1, for
situations of non-agreement in round 1. For Step 5 and beyond, all shippers have knowledge
of the freight forwarder’s preferred offer. We evaluate the shipper’s offer which may or may
not be revised from pass 1, in the light of knowledge of the freight forwarder’s preferred offer
(which is different to that of the shipper in pass 1). We might include a variable representing
the actual offer from the freight forwarder  in the previous round.
· Step 6: Evaluate the influences on the pass agreement (1,0) outcome for the second sequential
move offers, following the approach in Step 3.
· Step 7: Calculate the expected utility matrix for the shipper and the freight forwarder and
identify the cooperation probability for each alternative in pass 2.
· Step 8: Second sequential move of the freight forwarder given the shipper’s revised or
maintained offer in pass 2, for situations of non-agreement in round 2. We evaluate the freight
forwarder’s offer which may or may not be revised from pass 2, in the light of knowledge of
the shipper’s preferred offer (which is different to that of the freight forwarder in pass 2). We
include a variable representing the actual offer from the freight forwarder in te previous
round.
· Step 9: Evaluate the influences on the pass agreement (1,0) outcome for the third sequential
move offers, following the approach in Step 3.
· Step10: Calculate the expected utility matrix for the shipper and the freight forwarder and
identify the cooperation probability for each alternative in pass 3.
The process continues subject to the number of steps required to achieve a cooperative
outcome and the limits on sample size for model estimation.
Estimation is potentially quite complex. The need to preserve the sequential structure as
well as recognise the possibility of non-independence between alternatives across the
agents suggest that a multinomial multi-period probit (MMP) specification is desirable.
Although more complex than the family of logit models where at best the variances are
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free (but all covariances are set to zero - see Hensher et al forthcoming), recent
developments is estimation using simulated moments developed by McFadden (1989)
and others can be implemented to obtain estimates of the choice probabilities.
In the example of one pair of shipper and freight forwarder, the model system involves
interdependence between a shipper and a freight forwarder, in which there are 6
alternatives in the choice set (3 for the shipper and 3 for the freight forwarder): Usi and
Uffi, I=1,2,3. Multinomial probit can be used to obtain parameter estimates and to
identify the nature of interaction as revealed through the covariance of the random
component of each utility expression. Table 4 illustrates a possible covariance matrix for
the random components of the utility functions associated with each alternative, for one
pass. The non-zero off-diagonal variances identify the non-independence of the
alternatives across agents. Lagged effects can also be introduced to accommodate the
recursive nature of negotiations across passes.
Table 3. Structure of the error covariance matrix for interactive agency choice 
modelling
Us1 Us2 Us3 Uf1 Uf2 Uf3
Us1
s1
2s
Us2 0
s 2
2s
Us3 0 0
s3
2s
Uf1
s1 f 1s s 2 f 1s s3 f 1s f 12s
Uf2
s1 f 2s s 2 f 2s s3 f 2s 0 f 22s
Uf3
s1 f 3s s 2 f 3s s3 f 3s 0 0 f 32s
Interacting Agents and Discrete Choices in Logistics Outsourcing: A Conceptual Framework
Hensher & Chow
11
Conclusions
This paper has introduced the idea of interactive agency choice into logistics channelling
where the linkages between actors or agents in the supply chain (ie carrier, freight
forwarder, shipper) are best represented as interdependencies or less-than-fully
competitive  actions, which through negotiation and bargaining within sub choice sets
produce outcomes which may or may not be the utility maximisation solution under
independent choosing; yet which are a more realistic reflection of what we ‘observe’
actually occurring in practice.
The idea of interactive agency choice has wider application in many areas of
transportation decision making than has been assumed in the literature of traveller
behaviour. Indeed the interdependencies between individuals in a household and even
between individuals in a particular peer structure are examples of the potential failure of
the independency imposed on nearly all discrete choice models in transportation  (there
may be exceptions but we are not aware of them, although DePalma and Lefevre (1983)
recognised the issue many years ago). Brewer and Hensher (1997) have recently
implemented the approach developed herein in the context of negotiations between
employers and employees to identify the constraints on telecommuting and incentives
required to support telecommuting.
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